摘要 :
Under what conditions does environmental non-governmental (NGO) advocacy affect environmental outcomes? We build on earlier theoretical work and contend that the influence of environmental NGO advocacy is conditioned on (a) the ab...
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Under what conditions does environmental non-governmental (NGO) advocacy affect environmental outcomes? We build on earlier theoretical work and contend that the influence of environmental NGO advocacy is conditioned on (a) the ability of local citizens to participate in the advocacy and (b) the vulnerability of the state to external pressure. Without these conditions, environmental NGO advocacy alone will not improve environmental conditions. Using a global dataset of environmental NGO advocacy and focusing on reductions in CO2 emissions, we evaluate the implications of this argument in a global sample of countries from 1975-2010. We find much support for our argument among non-OECD countries.
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摘要 :
In 1998, Evert Vedung posited a typology of policy instruments making governing akin to a conversation with a donkey: regulatory (sticks), economic (carrots) and information-based (sermons) instruments. Kathryn Harrison later appl...
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In 1998, Evert Vedung posited a typology of policy instruments making governing akin to a conversation with a donkey: regulatory (sticks), economic (carrots) and information-based (sermons) instruments. Kathryn Harrison later applied this typology to pollution control in her popular 'Talking with the Donkey' piece. Though command-and-control instruments were central up until the late 1990s, growing global interest in 'New Environmental Policy Instruments' (NEPI) led to a disinterest in regulatory mechanisms and an increase in attention to information-based and economic instruments. Are governments using regulation as a policy instrument now more than before or are they choosing policy mixes? In this paper, I examine the state of the art regarding regulation as an environmental policy instrument by exploring whether the apparent shift to NEPI did reduce interest in environmental regulation as a policy instrument. I find that policy experiments with models of policy instruments led to increased interest in policy instrument mixes. Evidence from a systematic review of JEPP scholarship and a broader scholarly review of the literature on environmental policy instruments over the past 20 years focused on drinking water and solid waste governance suggest that policy mixes might work best when faced with conditions of uncertainty and governance complexity.
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